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This paper investigates the role of credit market sentiments and investor beliefs on credit cycle dynamics
and their propagation to business cycle fluctuations. Using US data from 1968 to 2019, we show that
credit market sentiments are indeed able to detect asymmetries in a small-scale macroeconomic model.
By exploiting recent developments in behavioral finance on expectation formation in financial markets, we
are able to identify an unexpected credit market news shock exhibiting different impacts in an optimistic
and pessimistic credit market environment. While an unexpected movement in the optimistic regime leads
to a rather low to muted impact on output and credit, we find a significant and persistent negative impact
on those variables in the pessimistic regime. Therefore, this article departs from the current literature
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1 Introduction
The Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 to 2009 revived the interest among economists and policymakers
about the role of credit expansion and investor beliefs for the subsequent financial crisis. For instance, Rajan
(2006) already recognized before the beginning of the GFC that the financial system is admittedly more
resilient against small shocks through diversified risks, but more prone to systemic shocks through stronger
linkages. A few years after the crisis, Stein (2014) emphasis in a speech at the Federal Reserve Board that
policy makers should think about incorporating financial market risk in monetary policy decisions to account
for these linkages. By stressing financial instability leading scholars brought back the narrative proposed by
Minsky (1977) which gained popularity again.
He provides arguments that crises are endogenous phenomena and inherently tied to financial markets.
The mechanism starts with an expansion of credit and investment leading to prosperous times. However, a
speculative euphoria sets off which eventually ends in a crisis when optimism abates. Thus, the emergence
of crises is endogenized by the incorporation of market sentiments in this approach. In the present article, we
see those sentiments as crucial dynamic driver and exploit a belief formation mechanism with microfounded
expectations to identify unexpected movements in the sentiment of the credit market. We argue that this
unexpected news shock is exogenous to the economy and show empirically within a stylized model of the US
macroeconomy that a credit market sentiment shock leads to asymmetric effects on credit and business cycle
fluctuations.
Therefore, we depart from the literature relying on financial frictions in explaining instability in the credit
cycle. Those theories typically endow their agents with rational expectations (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989;
Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997) who cut back on investment and reduce borrowing when their ability to borrow
is being constrained. Since agents are not fully aware what their borrowing decisions trigger in the aggregate
economy, they are confronted with externalities in leverage choice. Through the identification of leverage as
variable capturing the fragility of the system, a plethora of empirical studies using balance-sheet measures
as predictors of recessions has been initiated (Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jordà et al., 2016; Mian et al.,
2017; Baron and Xiong, 2017). In summary, according to this strand of literature the driving force behind
fluctuations can be traced back to some sort of market imperfections.
On the contrary, behavioral theories stressed the importance of overoptimism in the wake of a credit boom,
starting with the seminal contributions of Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978). Similar findings emerge
from the literature in behavioral finance, thereby stressing the time-varying component of credit conditions
when relaxing the assumption of updating beliefs via rational expectations. The literature introduces beha-
vioral elements in the expectation formation mechanism of agents. For instance, Greenwood and Hanson
(2013) show that credit quality of corporate debt issuers deteriorates when the credit market is overheating
and is thus a better predictor for recessions than rapid aggregate credit growth. Another example, contributed
by Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012), finds that an excess bond premium (EBP) is also able to predict recessions.
In a similar vein, López-Salido et al. (2017) find that low credit spreads predict both a rise in credit spreads
and a downfall in economic activity linking it to some sort of market sentiments.
Following Simon (1957), many scholars have criticized the unrealistically strong informational and
computational requirements upon individual behavior imposed by strict rationality. As an answer, several
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branches of literature arose relaxing this assumption and paying attention to bounded rationality. One branch
is the literature on learning in the expectation formation process (Sargent, 1993; Evans and Honkapohja,
1999), another one forming the rational inattention literature (Sims, 2003; Gabaix, 2014) and finally the
behavioral literature using simple psychological heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In a learning-to-
forecast experimental study, Anufriev and Hommes (2012) find several robust heuristics when agents forecast
asset prices and develop a behavioral model of heterogeneous expectations. In a different set-up, Assenza
et al. (2011) find that the results also hold in a macroeconomic context. In a more recent contribution by
Bordalo et al. (2018) the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) was operationalized
and presented as a new belief formation mechanism, called diagnostic expectations, to explain credit cycles.
While the financial frictions approach assumes exogenous shocks and rational expectations in order to
explain fluctuations, the latter theories provide endogenous explanations without relying on the assumption
of strict rationality. However, Matsuyama et al. (2016) proposes a model of endogenous credit cycles in
an overlapping-generations set-up without leaving the realm of rational expectations utilizing the limited
pledgeability of collaterals as a parsimonious friction specification (Tirole, 2010). The authors acknowledge
that their process resembles the mechanism proposed by Minsky (1977) but state that „[t]he model [...] does
not rely on any form of irrationality“ (Matsuyama et al., 2016, p. 528). A recent contribution by Kubin et al.
(2019) takes this as starting point and extend the model by endogenizing the pledgeability parameter and
allowing it to vary over time. The pledgeability ratio is then determined by a simple heuristic rule: if the net
worth as a proxy for the current state of the economy is above or below some threshold, the agents’ sentiment
switches between an ’optimistic’ and ’pessimistic’ credit market regime reflecting the psychological state
of the lenders. This translates in varying degrees of what lenders are willing to accept as collateral and
thus provide an endogenous behavioral explanations how the general, or in particular the business, mood is
anchored in the perceptions about agency problems.
We take this theoretical approach as a starting point and propose an empirical macroeconomic model that
accounts for both an endogenous explanation of credit cycles and switching dynamics resulting from periods
of optimism and pessimism on the credit market. Therefore, we examine the conjecture that credit market
sentiments can exert disruptive forces on the credit and business cycle. Hereby, we differentiate between
optimistic and pessimistic credit market conditions and expect more severe effects when the financial system
is already under distress. Furthermore, we argue that if agents receive bad news about the state of the
economy, a deterioration of the sentiments towards the credit market sets in and subsequently credit spreads
rise. Consequently, this translates to the real sphere of the economy and we expect a decline of credit,
investment and finally output. To investigate the proposed relationship we employ a nonlinear VAR using
monthly data covering the period between January 1968 and December 2014 of the US economy. This set-up
allows us to investigate the impact of a credit market sentiment shock, which corresponds in our view to an
unexpected news shock on the credit market.
Moreover, our paper is also related to the literature on structural identification in VARs. While the
structural VAR literature has made great advancements in identifying monetary policy shocks (Gertler and
Karadi, 2015), the literature looking at the feedbacks on financial markets or modeling financial shocks in an
explicit manner is rather scarce. Studies have mostly focused on single-equation models (Krishnamurthy and
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Muir, 2017; López-Salido et al., 2017) and reduced form multi-equation models (Gilchrist and Zakrajšek,
2012). A recent contribution by Caldara and Herbst (2019) adds credit spread variables into a structurally
identified multivariate framework, but confine themselves to monetary policy shocks. To our knowledge
there are only two other contributions dealing with the identification of a credit spread shock. Brunnermeier
et al. (2017) use the identification-via-heteroscedasticity approach and identify a monetary policy shock and
two „stress“ shocks, which originate in the financial sector and propagate to the real economy. However,
Carriero et al. (2018) is closer to our application where they develop a variant of a smooth transition VAR
model employing a Cholesky identification strategy to identify a credit conditions shock among others.
To summarize, our contribution is threefold. First, we use a non-linear specification to disentangle phases
of optimism and pessimism on the credit market. It is a rather well-established fact in the literature on credit
activity that financialmarkets operate and react quite differentwhen under distress than in periods of tranquility
(see, for example Balke (2000) or for a more recent contribution regarding uncertainty shocks Alessandri
and Mumtaz (2019)). Second, we use a sophisticated shrinkage prior setup utilizing recent developments
in the Bayesian literature on VARs (Huber and Feldkircher, 2019). Third, we propose a novel identification
mechanism inspired by the literature on identification via external instruments (Mertens and Ravn, 2013;
Gertler and Karadi, 2015) based on diagnostic expectations as belief formation mechanism (Bordalo et al.,
2018). In order to robustify our results we use also other behavioral belief formation mechanism discussed
in Anufriev and Hommes (2012). With this strategy, we are able to identify a credit market sentiment shock,
where unexpected news leads to dynamics of optimism and pessimism on the credit market.
Our results show that a credit market sentiment shock has two distinct features. First, there are strong
asymmetries across different credit market regimes. If the credit market is calm, an unexpected news shock of
the credit market sentiment induces short-lasting and low to muted effects on the credit and business cycles.
On the contrary, in rather turbulent times when a pessimistic mood is already prevailing in the economy,
a credit market sentiment shock engenders severe negative effects to the business and credit cycle and, in
addition, leads to a drop in prices. The economy recovers approximately after one year.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. After looking in more depth at our credit market
sentiment indicator and the issue of belief formation in macroeconomics in Section 2, which displays the main
identifying assumption in the model, we introduce our nonlinear VAR framework and the technical details
on our identification strategy in Section 3. Our main results and further robustness analyses are discussed in
Section 4 and Section 5 concludes.
2 Expectation formation in macroeconomics
The causes for recurring economic recessions and instabilities is subject to a variety of explanations. There
exists a plethora of studies finding the source of instabilities in an exogenous shock to the economy. As
our model relies on endogenous explanations backed by behavioral arguments, we focus on endogenous
explanations and the role of expectation formation as origin of instabilities. Following Minsky’s idea,
a prominent example explaining credit market fluctuations was put forward by Matsuyama et al. (2016).
However, their model rests on the assumption of rational expectation as belief formation mechanism.1 The
1 Note that we will use the term ’belief’ and ’expectation’ in our context interchangeably.
4
THE IMPACT OF CREDIT MARKET SENTIMENT SHOCKS - A TVAR APPROACH
underlying idea is that financial frictions cause and amplify instability and recurring fluctuations. In a recent
extension, Kubin et al. (2019) relax the assumption of rational expectation and incorporate empirical findings
from the behavioral finance literature that credit market sentiments play indeed a role in driving aggregate
fluctuations (Greenwood and Hanson, 2013; López-Salido et al., 2017). Behavioral elements are introduced
to the model to account for a time-varying perception of risk. Thus, beliefs about the state of the economy are
directly incorporated and raise the question of how people perceive the state of the economy. While Kubin
et al. (2019) model the perception-dependent pledgeability parameter in a deterministic fashion depending
on the agents’ net worth, we are opting for a different approach here.
We make use of the credit spread between yields on seasoned long-term Baa-rated corporate bonds and
yields on long-term treasury securities (Baa spread) as our realized credit market sentiment indicator. Based
on this sentiment indicator we raise the question of how agents form their expectation about it. Henceforth the
sentiment on the credit market is denoted as a time series process {ωt }Tt=1. This time series exhibits financial
anomalies, which should not be present according to the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970).2 For
example, a prominent anomaly was put forward by Bordalo et al. (2018). Using survey data, they were able to
show that forecast errors (and interestingly, also forecast revisions) may be predictable which contradicts the
efficient market hypothesis. In general, they found that a path of high returns triggers agents to overestimate
the probability of high returns in the future (’excessive optimism’) while bad returns yield lower forecasts
of future returns (’excessive pessimism’). Therefore, we depart from the agents’ net worth as sentiment
indicator and argue that the Baa spread is indeed a good operationalization for the sentiment on the credit
market.
As we rely on a specific belief formationmechanism to identify our model, somewords about the evolution
of this literature are in order. There exist a broad branch of contributions which explores optimal behavior
under situations where agents’ rationality is somehow bounded (see, e.g., Adam and Marcet (2011) for asset
pricing topics, Cogley and Sargent (2008), Eusepi and Preston (2011) and Malmendier and Nagel (2016)
for macroeconomic issues). All those approaches have the internal rationality or, in Simon’s (1955) words,
bounded rationality in common. This concept is based on the fact that agents have limited computational
abilities and no perfect foresight at all; they make use of simple heuristics or ’rules of thumb’ for their
decisions. Other reasons might include that the agents are not fully informed (external influences), or have
some internal misconceptions (see Kahneman (2003) for an introduction to fallacies, biased heuristics and
cognitivemisunderstandings in general) or other issueswhichmight occurwhen agents apply their heuristics in
the real world. In summary, the literature deviating from rational expectations using some form of bounded
rationality is far from having reached a consensus. While behavioral theories are built on some kind of
bounded rationality relaxing the assumption of rational expectations, rational structural uncertainty theories
tend to accept the rationality assumption but neglect the assumption of complete information. However,
Brav and Heaton (2002) show that it is actually quite difficult to distinguish between those approaches. In
particular, they consider a model with a one-period risky asset paying an uncertain dividend at the end of the
period. They then show that both their models, one with an agent endowed with rationality but incomplete
information and the other with a behavioral agent, who behaves according to a simple heuristic, are able to
2 We follow here Brav and Heaton (2002, p. 575) in defining a ’financial anomaly’ as „a documented pattern of price behavior that
is inconsistent with the predictions of traditional efficient markets, rational expectations asset pricing theory“ .
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replicate financial anomalies (i.e. overreaction and underreaction in asset prices) frequently found in financial
markets.
By arguing that decisions in financial market activities have to be made in a fast and accurate manner,
we prefer an approach relying on some sort of heuristics to explain specific and observed behavior. We
are thus not following the branches of the learning literature (Sargent, 1993; Evans and Honkapohja, 1999)
or rational inattention literature (Sims, 2003; Gabaix, 2014). Agents may be backed by forecasts based on
rational expectations, but they are part of a complex system of human interactions, which shape their thinking
and „what investors and corporate managers think is what drives their actions. And some psychologists
would say that what people think derives from how they feel, which is influenced by their interactions with
others“(Nofsinger, 2005, p. 144).
For studying agents’ actual expectation formation routine, laboratory experiments are themethod of choice.
Those experiments mainly try to elicit how human behavior tends to form expectations by putting them into
controlled situations and monitor their actions. Wagener (2014), for example, discusses experimental results
of learning-to-forecast experiments in economics and analyses the implications for the rational expectations
hypothesis. A typical characteristic of the employed models concerns a group formation depending on the
expectation formation routine including a potential switching between the heuristics according to the past
performance. In an experimental setting, the subjects can choose between different expectation formation
hypotheses and observe their performance. Due to some evolutionary switching agents try to find the ’true’
expectation equation which minimizes their forecast error. Most interestingly, Hommes (2009) and Hommes
et al. (2017) show in learning-to-forecast experiments that a few number of simple heuristics – combined
with an evolutionary switching between them – is sufficient to describe expectation formation of economic
agents.
For our purpose, Assenza et al. (2011) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012) provide valuable experimental
insights on what heuristics agents actually use for forecasting asset prices or macroeconomic variables.
Based on this set of heuristics they propose a behavioral model of how heterogeneous expectations are
formed, where evolutionary selection takes place among the expectation formation rules. In learning-to-
forecast experiments (LtFEs) participants have to forecast a risky asset price for 50 consecutive periods.
They knew that the price of the risky asset is in each round determined by market clearing as an aggregation
of the individual forecasts, but they only got displayed the realized price, their forecast and their past own
earnings. Thus, in the experiment, there exists a positive feedback from the individual price forecast to the
realized market price on which the agents’ earnings depend. Although the price movements varied across
different experimental sessions, a striking result of the LtFEs is that in all sessions participants managed to
coordinate their forecasting behavior. They can be boiled down to four different heuristics, which participants
used to predict the asset price: the adaptive heuristic (ADA), the weak and strong trend-following heuristic
(WTR and STR) and the anchoring and adjustment heuristic with and without learning (AA and LAA). If
the price tends to slowly converge to its fundamental value, all participants tend to use the adaptive heuristic.
In the limiting case without any weight on their own past prediction, this heuristic collapses to the case
of naive expectations.3 The second and third heuristic uses the last price observation and adjusts it in the
3 Basically, they utilize the random walk, ERWt (ωt+1) = ωt , for predicting future values. Essentially, this means that the best forecast
of tomorrow is the realized value of today.
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direction of the last price change. The differentiation in weak and strong trend-followers is according to
some extrapolation coefficient. If this compared to the strong trend-following case with a parameter value
exceeding unity. With the last heuristic, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, agents extrapolate the last
price change from a reference point (anchor), which they believe to be the „long-run“ price level. In the
case without learning this reference point is the fundamental value of the asset price, which is then replaced
in the case with learning with the sample average of past prices. In Tab. 1 the exact expectation formation
mechanisms laid out in Assenza et al. (2011) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012) can be found.4
Finally, a recent contribution by Bordalo et al. (2018) introduces an expectation formation mechanism
called diagnostic expectations which rests on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1972) representativeness heuristic.
This heuristic states that agents judge a trait or attribute of a certain population as more common when the
relative frequency of this attribute in a certain population appears to be much higher than in a reference
population. Therefore, people overestimate certain traits of a certain population which are then diagnostic
for this population.5 When using this heuristic in a dynamic perspective, the reference group is formed on
the absence of information at time point t. Bordalo et al. (2018) formulate a probability distribution of the
sentiment ωt , which is inflated by a term representing representativeness,
pDEt (ωˆt+1) = p(ωˆt+1 | ωt = ωˆt ) ×
[
p(ωˆt+1 | ωt = ωˆt )
p(ωˆt+1 | ωt = φωˆt−1)
]θ 1
Z
, (2.1)
where the normalizing constant Z ensures that the probability distribution integrates to unity and θ ∈ [0,∞]
measures the severity of judging by representativeness. Note that if θ = 0 the distortionary term vanishes
meaning that agents use all information, which corresponds to the assumption of rational expectations. The
first term is the conditional distribution using rational expectations by using current news ωˆt for predicting
ωˆt+1. The second term is the ratio of using current news and using the prediction from news at ωˆt−1, assumed
to follow an AR(1) process with parameter φ. Thus, the probability of the most representative states is
inflated. This represents memory limits, as beliefs inflate the probability of representative states and vice
versa. Therefore, as long as θ > 0 memory is limited. Tab. 1 provides the expectation formulation of this
term. Bordalo et al. (2018) assume a standard AR(1) model with homoscedastic errors. However, we extend
this to a stochastic volatility specification, because periods of financial turmoil crucially affect this specific
memory. In turbulent phases, a variety of events occurs contemporaneously limiting the memory and leading
to biases. Details and derivations are provided in Appendix C. Note that we use for our analysis only the first
moment of the diagnostic expectation. Concerning the parameter θ, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2018) refer to
values within 0.7 and 1.0 where we stick to the value provided in Bordalo et al. (2018), θ = 0.91.
We will use the heuristics given in Tab. 1 to predict the Baa spread, which is our credit market sentiment
indicator. However, we abstain from using the AA heuristic with fixed anchor since there is not really a
fundamental value of a credit market sentiment. For the heuristic with a learning anchor the moving average
4 For a detailed treatment of heterogeneous expectation formation and bounded rationality in finance and macroeconomics, we refer
the interested reader to Hommes (2006) and Hommes (2009) for excellent surveys.
5 For clarification we refer to the example given in Bordalo et al. (2018). Assume that you try to predict the share of red-haired
Irish people. Most probably you will overestimate the share of red-haired Irish people since this trait is diagnostic for the Irish and
occurs much more frequently than in your reference population. Except you are an Irishwoman or -man.
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Table 1: Set of heuristics
ADA adaptive rule EADAt (ωt+1) = 0.65ωt−1 + EADAt−1 (ωt )
WTR weak trend-following rule EWTRt (ωt+1) = ωt−1 + 0.4(ωt−1 − ωt−2)
STR strong trend-following rule ESTRt (ωt+1) = ωt−1 + 1.3(ωt−1 − ωt−2)
LAA anchoring and adjustment rule with
learning anchor
ELAAt (ωt+1) = 0.5(ωavt−1 + ωt−1) + (ωt−1 − ωt−2)
AA anchoring and adjustment rule with
fixed anchor
EAAt (ωt+1) = 0.5(ω f + ωt−1) + (ωt−1 − ωt−2)
DE diagnostic expectations EDEt (ωt+1) = Et (ωt+1) + θ[Et (ωt+1) − Et−1(ωt+1)]
Notes: While ω f denotes the fundamental value, it can be learned by the sample average ωav
t−1 dependent on the
information set up to time point t.
of the last 24 months is employed. Since Bordalo et al. (2018) is in a theoretical and practical manner much
more related to our work, we will use the diagnostic expectations as workhorse model and provide robustness
checks for the other heuristics.
Figure 1: Baa bond - Treasury credit spread and its diagnostic expectations.
Notes: The black line indicates the Baa spread, while the dashed line its corresponding diagnostic expectations. Gray shaded areas
denote the NBER recession dates.
In Fig. 1 we plot the original Baa spread along with its diagnostic expectations. The black solid line
denotes the credit spread while the dashed gray lines report the diagnostic expectations of the credit spread
in each time period. The light gray shaded areas are the NBER recession dates. For the sake of clarity,
we zoom in the plot between January 1998 and December 2004. Since we use credit market sentiments
and credit spreads synonymously (but with a reversed direction of impact; high or optimistic credit market
sentiments imply low credit spreads), we clarify that we actually mean the expected return to bearing credit
risk when talking about credit market sentiments. From Fig. 1 the high correlation between recessions and
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elevated credit spreads is rather easy to see. Looking closer at the plot, we see the effect of diagnostic
expectations. After a few periods of going up/down, rational expectations and diagnostic expectations are
closely in line with each other. But after a reversal, diagnostic expectations overshoot in both directions due
to the representativeness heuristic. Agents believe that those actions happening in the previous period also
have the highest probability in the current period (i.e. go further up/down) and thus underestimate the tail
risk of a reversal. It is thus an easy exercise to compute the diagnostic forecast error, which we assume to be
an unexpected news shock. Agents employ the representativeness heuristic and forecast sentiments according
to diagnostic expectations and are thus overweighting past information pointing further up or down. Later on
we will use this diagnostic forecast error, or unexpected news or sentiment shock, for identifying our model.
3 A VAR with credit market regimes
The next subsections introduce our nonlinear VAR model and describe the estimation and identification
approach. Since we rely on an external instruments approach for identification, we provide a detailed
discussion on our identification strategy related to diagnostic expectations.
3.1 Structure of the model
Empirical macroeconomic analysis is nowadays strongly based on linear VAR models (Sims, 1980), but they
fail to capture non-linear dynamics such as regime-switching or asymmetric responses to shocks. When
looking at credit cycle dynamics, the applied models are usually specified in a nonlinear fashion. This allows
to capture that shocks are propagated differently in different credit regimes (Balke, 2000; Atanasova, 2003).
Our set of M = 5 endogenous variables consists of
Yt = {BAAT10t, INDPROt,BUSLOANSt,CPIAUCSLt,FFRWXSRt }, (3.1)
where BAAT10t denotes the creditmarket sentiment, INDPROt the industrial production growth, BUSLOANSt
business loans growth, CPIAUCSLt consumer price inflation and FFRWXSRt a short-term interest rate.
We will characterize the credit market sentiment with a the aforementioned credit spread, namely the spread
between yields on seasoned long-term Baa-rated corporate bonds and yields on long-term treasury securities
(10y government bond yield). Therefore, when the sentiment is elevated this is equivalent in saying that the
expected return to bearing credit risk is low and thus the spread is narrow. As short-term interest rate we use
the federal funds rate and also its shadow rate provided byWu and Xia (2016). Except of the aforementioned,
all data comes from the FRED database (McCracken and Ng, 2016), is on a monthly frequency and growth
rates are computed as annualized log-differences. Details can be found in Appendix A.
Thus, the multivariate time series model runs from t0 = 1968 : M01 and ends in T = 2014 : M12 with
regimes {St = i}i=1,2 and reads as follows:
Yt =

c1 +
∑p
j=1 A1jYt−j + Λ1et, if St = 1,
c2 +
∑p
j=1 A2jYt−j + Λ2et, if St = 2,
(3.2)
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where Ai j are the regime-specific M × M coefficient matrices for each lag j = 1, . . . , p. The intercept is
denoted by ci and Λi is the lower-triangular Cholesky factor, thus Σi = ΛiΛTi holds. Furthermore, et is an
M × 1 vector of structural shocks with E(et ) = 0, E(eteTt ) = I and E(et, eTs ) = 0 for s  t where I denotes the
identity matrix.
Our modeling framework thus allows for the occurrence of regime shifts, where the two sets of parameters
{ci, Ai j,Σi}i=1,2 describe the different dynamics of the economy depending on whether the economy is in an
optimistic or pessimistic credit market regime. Our line of reasoning here is that agents behave differently
when confronted with a positive or negative atmosphere at the financial markets. Therefore, the credit market
sentiment indicator serves as a threshold variable,
St = 1 ⇐⇒ CSt−d ≤ γ,
St = 2 ⇐⇒ CSt−d > γ,
(3.3)
where both, the threshold parameter γ and the delay parameter d are treated as unknown parameters. Note
that all parameters are allowed to change across regimes. We use p = 13 lags due to monthly data and fix
the delay parameter d = 1 as financial markets react rather quick. Concerning the covariance matrix of the
residuals, we factorize
Σi = H−1i DH
−1T
i , (3.4)
where Hi is a lower triangular matrix with ones on the main diagonal and D = diag(d1, . . . , dM ) is a diagonal
matrix with regime-invariant variances.
Estimation is based on a Bayesian framework and an MCMC algorithm is employed to sample from the
joint posterior distribution. Since the joint posterior density is not tractable, we use a Gibbs sampler to draw
from the conditional posterior densities iteratively. The whole algorithm is described in detail in Appendix B
of the paper.
Some discussion of additional prior choices and algorithm sketches are in order. We impose on each
element of Ai j , which is denoted as ai j ,kl, where k = 0, . . . ,M starts at 0 when we include the intercept
(only if j = 1) and otherwise k, l = 1, . . . ,M , a variant of the Normal-Gamma (NG) shrinkage prior. For
the sake of brevity, we refrain from postulating the prior on the intercept, but treat it as an element of Ai1.
This prior is strongly centered on a zero mean, but features also fat tails. Therefore, coefficients are shrunk
towards zero if they entail no information inducing sparsity to the system. The NG prior has an idiosyncratic
shrinkage component τik allowing for an individual degree of shrinkage and a lagwise shrinkage parameter
λi j that shrinks all elements of αi towards zero while punishing for a higher lag order. Following Huber and
Feldkircher (2019) the lagwise NG prior per regime i reads
ai j ,kl | τi j ,kl ∼  (ai j ,kl,2/λ2i jτi j ,kl), τi j ,kl ∼  (ϑτ, j, ϑτ, j), (3.5)
with ai j ,kl = 0. Furthermore, we put a prior on ϑτ,i j ∼ Exp(1), which centers ϑτ,i j a priori on unity
translating into the Bayesian LASSO (Park and Casella, 2008) but allowing for additional flexibility through
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the hyperprior. For the lagwise specification, we impose an additional prior on λ2i j for each Ai j ,
λ2i j =
j∏
g=1
ζig, (3.6)
with independent Gamma priors on each ζig ∼  (c0, d0). Those hyperparameters are set equal to c0 = d0 =
0.01. As long as ζig exceeds unity, this prior shrinks coefficients associated with higher lags more towards
zero through a more severe global shrinkage component λ2i j . This implies that the coefficient matrix Ai j
becomes increasingly sparse for higher lags. We proceed by imposing also a NG prior on the free off-diagonal
elements hi,kl of Hi,
hi,kl | φi,kl ∼  (hi,kl,2/ξ2i φi,kl), φi,kl ∼  (ϑφ, ϑφ), (3.7)
with h = 0 and again a hyperprior on ϑφ ∼ Exp(1) allowing for additional flexibility. Similar to the lagwise
specification, we also put a Gamma prior on ξ2j ∼  (c0, d0). The remaining prior choices are rather standard.
The main intuition behind the algorithm to estimate our model can be summarized as follows. First,
we sample the threshold parameter γ via an adaptive random-walk Metropolis-Hastings step and due to the
adaptive nature of the algorithm (Haario et al., 2001) we achieve acceptance probabilities between 20% and
40%. Applying the idea of data-augmentation we can split the data into regime-specific observations and can
then sample the regime-specific coefficients. For details, we refer to Appendix B.
3.2 Identification
We are interested in computing impulse response functions of a credit market sentiment shock. In order to
identify the shock we rely on external instruments using the methodology developed by Mertens and Ravn
(2013) and Gertler and Karadi (2015). After estimating the model we obtain the reduced form errors, denoted
by t and which are related to the structural shocks as follows
St = ΛieSt , if St = i, (3.8)
where E(St TSt ) = E(ΛiΛTi ) = Σi for i = 1,2. Denoting Y
p
t ∈ Yt the credit market sentiment variable and
with ept its associated structural shock with exogenous variation, we are able to identify this structural shock
through an external instrument Zt without taking an identifying stance on all other structural shocks. Let eqt
be a vector structural shock other than the identified credit market sentiment shock. A valid instrument Zt
for the sentiment shock has then to be correlated with ept and orthogonal to e
q
t , such that:
E(ZtepTt ) = Φ,
E(ZteqTt ) = 0.
(3.9)
We proceed in a two-stage manner: first, we regress the reduced form error  p
St
on the instrument ZSt
to isolate the variation in the reduced form residual for the sentiment that is due to the news shock in a
regime-wise manner. Similar to a two stage least squares procedure, we form the fitted values ˆ p
St
and regress
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them in the second stage regression on the other reduced form residuals

q
St
=
λ
q
i
λ
p
i
ˆSt + νSt if St = i, (3.10)
where ˆSt is orthogonal to the error term νSt , given that the assumption in Eq. (3.9) that ZSt is orthogonal to
all the structural shocks other than the shock to the sentiment indicator ep
St
. Thus, λqi denotes the response of

q
St
to a unit increase in the sentiment shock ep
St
. Using the reduced form variance-covariance matrix Σi, an
estimate for λpi can be derived which finally enables us to identify the responses to a structural shock in e
p
St
.
For details we refer to Appendix D.
As we discussed in Section 2, the forecast errors of the diagnostic expectation of the credit market
sentiment to its realized value is employed as instrument ZSt . As pointed out by Bordalo et al. (2018)
diagnostic expectations have the nice property to be forward-looking and are thus immune to the Lucas
critique. In our interpretation, the forecast errors are unexpected news shocks; agents do not forecast
according to rational expectations, but with diagnostic expectations and are simply not able to spot sentiment
reversals such that expectations tend to overshoot. After periods of elevated credit spreads agents would
predict a further surge of credit spreads since their memory is limited and assess the probability of a further
increase larger than it actually is.
Concerning the validity criterion in Eq. (3.9) we argue that unexpected movements in the credit market
sentiment have a strong correlation with the sentiment itself due to empirical findings of Bordalo et al.
(2018). They show that even prediction errors are forecastable making it indeed a valid instrument but are
decoupled from macroeconomic fundamentals. This states that a sentiment shock is strongly correlated with
the structural innovation in the credit market. Furthermore, we argue that the instrument is orthogonal to
all the other structural innovations. In this regard, exogenous shocks to macroeconomic fundamentals, i.e.
an unexpected oil price shock due to the discovery of new technical possibilities for oil production, terrorist
attacks or natural disasters, are neither caused nor contemporaneously correlated with the prevalent sentiment
on the credit market.
4 Results
This section is dedicated to the discussion of the results. First, we discuss the estimated credit market regimes
while the second subsection presents the results of the impulse response analysis when shocking the credit
market sentiment across the estimated regimes. In the third subsection we provide a sensitivity analysis using
alternative expectation formation mechanisms, identification schemes or variables. We use p = 13 lags due
to monthly data and all our estimations are based on sufficient MCMC draws.
4.1 Credit market regimes
In Fig. 2 we report the Baa spread along with the associated probabilities of being in one of the two regimes.
The probabilities are calculated by looking at how often the threshold variable has surpassed the estimated
threshold parameter γ. Note that the scaling of the plot is different compared to Fig. 1 since we scaled all
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Figure 2: Credit market sentiment regimes.
Notes: Gray shaded areas represent the periods when the US economy is estimated to be in a pessimistic credit market regime (right
scale), defined as a state where the Baa spread exceeds the critical threshold in the TVAR of Section 3.
variables to exhibit zero mean and a standard deviation of unity prior to the estimation. By fixing the delay
parameter to unity, we assume that the credit sentiment in the month before is crucial in determining the
credit market regime in time point t. We label the two credit market regime as either optimistic or pessimistic
credit market sentiment regime.
After inspection we notice that the pessimistic credit market sentiment regime approximately coincides
with the NBER recession dates, but cover a much longer period of time. This states that the credit market
sentiment is still elevated although the recession may gone through the depression point and the economy is
already recovering. This can be traced back to the fact that ’bad’ experiences are still in the memory of the
economic agents which are still too cautious switching to the optimistic regime. Apart from this observation,
our regimes resembles the experienced business cycles of the US economy.
4.2 The impact of a credit market sentiment shock
We now turn to the impulse response analysis of the impact of a credit market sentiment shock. As already
pointed out and discussed in light of Eq. (3.9) we intend to look at an exogenous shock to the credit market
sentiment variable. In our main specification this is the Baa spread, defined as the spread between yields
on seasoned long-term Baa-rated corporate bonds and yields on long-term treasury securities. The shock is
defined as an 100 basis point increase in the Baa spread, which is a medium deprivation of the sentiment.
For instance, during the last financial crisis the US economy experienced a surge of the Baa spread of almost
400 basis points. In Fig. 3 we report the impulse response functions over the horizon of 24 months. For each
regime the figure reports the median impulse response and the associated 84%, 90% and 95% confidence
13
M. BÖCK & T. ZÖRNER
Figure 3: Impulse responses of a credit market sentiment shock (diagnostic expectations).
Notes: Identification via diagnostic expectations. The black dashed line is the median response per regime, while the gray shaded
areas depict the 95%, 90% and 84% credible set interval.
bands. In both regimes, after a negative sentiment shock hits the economy, the sentiment tends to deteriorate
further unless mean-reversion starts after about one year. In both panels the uncertainty bands tend to be
rather big accounting for relatively high uncertainty. However, the responses are still significant. The upper
panel depicts the optimistic credit market sentiment regime, whereas the lower panel exhibits the pessimistic
one. Generally, the impacts in an optimistic credit market regime are rather muted across all variables.
There is a slight reaction on industrial production and business loans along with relatively high uncertainty
concerning the reaction of prices and short-term interest rates. This is consistent with our expectations and
the theoretical models. For instance, the model developed by Kubin et al. (2019), would also predict a rather
small to negligible effect on the business and credit cycle in an optimistic regime.
However, the picture reverses when looking at the impact of the credit market sentiment shock in the
pessimistic regime. The responses are much more pronounced: the contraction is relatively abrupt and the
peak fall in output is about five times larger (-0.27% versus -1.51%). When looking at impulse response of
business loans, we interestingly find a positive shock on impact, which turns negative quite fast. Peak fall in
credit is about four times larger in the pessimistic than in the optimistic credit market regime (-0.39% versus
-1.71%) and stronger than the fall in output. Furthermore, we observe a drop in prices. The effect is rather
short lasting and tends to smooth out quickly after a few months. Besides the positive shock on impact (we
call it the ’credit puzzle’), the responses are in line with theory. We find a stronger impact on business loans
than on output and both react quite strong due to a shock on credit market sentiments. Furthermore, both
variables tend to reverse and finally fade after some time. It takes about three quarter of a year that output
recovers and a whole year for credit. The initial positive reaction of business loans can be traced back to
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some sort of liquidity considerations by entrepreneurs. Expecting or foreseeing a credit crunch due to some
economic disruption may cause precautionary loans to ensure liquidity over the whole recessionary period.
Other intriguing empirical results arise from this figure. First, strong asymmetries across credit market
regimes are visible. A medium-sized drop in the sentiment leads to obviously distinct effects depending on
the general, prevailing mood in the economy. If the general vibe is good, a drop may cause some small
disturbances. After the dust has settled, agents realize that the general mood is still good and go back to
normal. On the contrary, if the general mood is already bad, another drop in the sentiment exhibits adverse
and strong effects. This is comparable to the Minsky-moment, or in our case the realization of the tail risks,
which are completely neglected by a forecasting rule like diagnostic expectations.
Moreover, we can relate the above described results to the idea of corridor stability, originally brought
up by Leijonhufvud (1973) and qualitatively adopted in the light of the GFC by Rajan (2006). Such a
phenomenon sees the economic or financial system as rather resilient against small shocks while large shocks
have an irreversible and catastrophic effect on the system. In our system, the degree of confidence may
influence this corridor, such that in an optimistic regime shocks hit a rather resilient economy. However,
turning to a pessimistic regime, this corridor is rather small such that a shock has severe impacts on the whole
economy.
4.3 Sensitivity
This section is dedicated to a sensitivity analysis to checkwhether our results are robust to other specifications.
First, we are experimenting with other expectation formation mechanisms based on different heuristics
Figure 4: Impulse responses of a credit market sentiment shock (different heuristics).
Notes: Identification via different heuristics depicted in Tab. 1. The black bold lines are the median responses per regime, while the
gray dashed lines represent the 84% credible set interval.
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depicted in Tab. 1. Second, we apply a Cholesky identification scheme with the Baa spread ordered first.
This translates into the assumption that all variables react contemporaneously.
When using forecast errors of the other heuristics in Tab. 1 (excluding the anchoring and adjustment
heuristic with fixed anchor), the impulse responses are generally similar to each other as Fig. 4 reveals.
Moreover, they are not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively comparable to those computed when using
diagnostic expectations. This is not surprising since those heuristics are mainly developed to capture
financial time series anomalies. Again, in the optimistic credit market regime rather small responses are
visible. Business loans react slightly and after some periods a significant price reaction is perceptible. The
pessimistic credit market regime has a strong negative reaction on the business and credit cycle variable and
also a rather strong price decrease is in the set of responses. Again, we observe kind of a credit puzzle;
however not significant for the used heuristics.
Turning to the identification via Cholesky ordering, where the Baa spread is ordered first, the qualitative
interpretation is similar as depicted in Fig. 5. The small negative reaction of business loans in the optimistic
credit market regime is not identifiable any more, but instead there appears a rather long-lasting negative
reaction of prices. In the pessimistic credit market regime the price reaction is more attenuated than in the
identification based on the external instrument. However, we see again a rather fast and strong drop in real
activity with fairly fast recovery while the negative reaction of business loans is more persistent. On the
contrary to our earlier results, the amplitude of the shocks is different. At the peak of the shock we observe
an about one third smaller reaction. Changing the ordering of the variables in the identification process does
not change the results qualitatively.6
Figure 5: Impulse responses of a credit market sentiment shock (Cholesky identification).
Notes: Identification via Cholesky scheme with Baa spread ordered first. The black dashed line is the median response per regime,
while the gray shaded areas depict the 95%, 90% and 84% credible set interval.
6 Results are available upon request by the authors.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we present a macroeconomic model of the US economy which is capable of controlling for
asymmetries at the credit market. Furthermore, we provide a novel identification strategy to analyze a
sentiment shock at the credit market. We are not only able to empirically confirm the theoretical predictions
of a model dealing with the endogenous explanations of cyclicity using sentiments (Kubin et al., 2019), but
also draw on recent developments in the behavioral finance literature, which embeds behavioral arguments
grounded in psychology within probability theory (Bordalo et al., 2018).
We estimate a structural threshold vector autoregression model (TVAR) with the credit spread as threshold
variable capturing the idea of switching sentiments. The estimated threshold separates the model space in an
optimistic and pessimistic credit market sentiment regime. Our identification strategy rests on the forecast
error agents make when using a heuristic to predict future values of a variable of interest. In our specific
approach, we use an operationalization of the psychologically backed representativeness heuristic to forecast
with diagnostic expectations according to Bordalo et al. (2018). The resulting forecast error can be thus
interpreted as news or sentiment shock on the credit market. This captures the idea that agents face a difficulty
in forecasting mean reversals, or sentiment changes on the credit market.
The estimated regime allocation fairly coincides with the NBER recession dates with slightly prolonged
pessimism after a recession. The results of a credit market sentiment shock (unexpected news shock) show
rather low to muted responses in the optimistic credit market regime, while the reaction of the business and
credit cycle variable in the pessimistic credit market regime is rather strong.
We thus provide a framework to embed advancements in the literature on expectation formation from a
behavioral tradition in recent achievements on structural identification in VAR models. Our results indicate
that it pays off to further strengthen the ties between behavioral studies mostly found in microeconomics and
macroeconometric analysis. Evidence from microeconomic studies and laboratory experiments are thus a
valuable source for easing strict assumptions frequently found in macroeconomics.
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A Data
Table 2: Data labels and sources
Database Variable Data set label Source
FRED Industrial Production IP: Index McCracken and Ng (2016)
Loans Commercial and Industrial Loans McCracken and Ng (2016)
Inflation CPI: All Items McCracken and Ng (2016)
Baa Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield McCracken and Ng (2016)
GS10 10-Year Treasury Rate McCracken and Ng (2016)
FFR Effective Federal Funds Rate McCracken and Ng (2016)
Wu-Xia SR Wu-Xia shadow federal funds rate Wu and Xia (2016)
Gilchrist-Zakrajšek EBP Excess bond premium Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012)
B MCMC algorithm
Since the joint posterior density of the proposed model has no closed form solution, we apply Markov Chain Monte
Carlo simulation techniques to draw from the joint posterior. Therefore, we employ a Gibbs sampler where we iterate
over the conditional posterior densities to draw from the full posterior distribution. We discard the first 5.000 of 20.000
draws in order to ensure convergence of the MCMC algorithm. In the following we outline our sampling scheme:
I. Sample the VAR coefficients by employing the triangular algorithm of Carriero et al. (2015). Hereby, we
transform the model such that we can estimate it equation by equation conditional on the state and the data.
Hereby, we take the difference between the dependent variable and the estimated residuals of all m − 1 (m =
1, . . . ,M) equations, such that
y∗m,St = ym,St −
m−1∑
l=1
hi,mld0.5m−1em−1,St , (B.1)
where we use only the data ym,St and innovations em−1,St which belong to the according regime. Thus, our
system is then just a seemingly unrelated regression model, where we draw each row of the coefficient matrices
Ai = (ci, Ai1, . . . , Aip) with dimension M × K with K = Mp + 1. We define Xt = (1T ,YTt−1, . . . ,YTt−p)T and
indicate the m-th row of Ai as A{m}i , such that the conditional posterior distribution reads
A{m}i | A{1:m−1}i ,Σi, γ ∼  (A{m}i ,V {m}i ), (B.2)
with
A
{m}
i = V
{m}
i
{
XSt y
∗T
j ,St
dj
+ diag
(
1
τi j ,m1
, . . . ,
1
τi j ,mK
)
ai,kl
}
,
V
{m}
i =
[
diag
(
1
τi j ,m1
, . . . ,
1
τi j ,mK
)
+
XSt X
T
St
dm
]−1
.
(B.3)
II. Sample the elements of Hi also equation by equation from normal distributions. We transform then the model to
e∗m,St = ym,St − XSt A
{m}
i . (B.4)
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Therefore, the conditional posterior distribution reads
hi,ml | A{m}i ,D, γ ∼  (hi,ml,Ui,ml) (B.5)
with
hi, j = V
{m}
i
{
e∗St y
T
j ,St
dj
+ diag
(
1
φi,m1
, . . . ,
1
φi,mM
)
hi,kl
}
,
Ui, j =
[
diag
(
1
φi,m1
, . . . ,
1
φi,mM
)
+
e∗St e
∗T
St
dm
]−1
.
(B.6)
III. Sample the regime-invariant variances of D from independent Inverse-Gamma distributions by rewriting the
model, such that
∗m = ym −
(
XSt=1A
{m}
1
XSt=2A
{m}
2
)
−
(∑m−1
l=1 h1,mld
0.5
m−1em−1,St=1∑m−1
l=1 h2,mld
0.5
m−1em−1,St=2
)
. (B.7)
Then, after combining the prior dm ∼ IG(a0, b0) where a0 = b0 = 0.01, with the likelihood, we get the
conditional posterior density as follows
dm | ∗m,Y ∼ IG(a0 + 0.5T, b0 + 0.5∗Tm ∗m). (B.8)
IV. Sample the parameters needed for the Normal-Gamma prior of the matrices Ai j . The conditional posterior
distribution of τi j ,kl follows a generalized inverse Gaussian (GIG) distribution,
τi j ,kl | ai j ,kl, ϑτ, j, λ2i j ∼ GIG
(
ϑτ, j − 12 , ϑτ, jλ
2
i j, (ai j ,kl − ai j ,kl)
)
, (B.9)
and the conditional posterior distribution of ζi j follows a Gamma distribution,
ζi j | τi j, ϑτ, j ∼ G c0 + ϑτ, jM2, d0 + 0.5ϑτ, jλ2i j−1
∑
k ,l∈Ai j
τi j ,kl
 . (B.10)
The conditional posterior distribution of ϑτ, j has no closed-form solution and thus a random-walk Metropolis-
Hastings step is implemented, where a candidate draw is drawn from ϑ∗τ, j ∼ 
(
ln(ϑ(n−1)τ, j ), κτ, j
)
, with κτ, j being
a tuning parameter. It reads
min
1,
(ϑ∗τ, jλ2i j/2)M
2ϑ∗τ , j Γ(ϑ∗τ, j)q(ϑ∗τ, j)
(ϑ∗τλ2i j/2)M
2ϑ(n−1)τ , j Γ(ϑ(n−1)τ, j )q(ϑ(n−1)τ, j )
 . (B.11)
V. Sample the parameters needed for the Normal-Gamma prior setup of the matrices Hi . The conditional posterior
distribution of φi,kl follows again a GIG distribution,
φi,kl | hi,kl, ϑφ, ξ2i ∼ GIG
(
ϑφ − 12 , ϑφξ
2
i , (hi,kl − hi,kl)
)
, (B.12)
and the conditional posterior distribution of ξ2i follows a Gamma distribution,
ξ2i | φi, ϑφ ∼ G(c0 + ϑφv, d0 + 0.5ϑφ/2
M∑
k=2
M−1∑
l=1
φi,kl), (B.13)
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where v denotes the number of free off-diagonal elements in Hi , v = M(M−1)2 . Again, the conditional posterior
distribution of ϑφ has no closed-form solution and a random-walk MH step is applied, where a candidate draw
is drawn from the following proposal distribution ϑ∗φ ∼  (ln(ϑ(n−1)φ ), κφ), with κφ being a tuning parameter. It
reads
min
1,
(ϑ∗φξ2i /2)vϑ
∗
φΓ(ϑ∗φ)q(ϑ∗φ)
(ϑ∗φξ2i /2)vϑ
(n−1)
φ Γ(ϑ(n−1)φ )q(ϑ(n−1)φ )
 . (B.14)
VI. Sample the threshold parameter γ according to a adaptive random-walk Metropolis-Hastings step. Hereby, we
follow Chen and Lee (1995) and propose a normally distributed candidate, γc = γ(n−1) + (0,C(n)), with C(n)
being a tuning parameter and (n) denoting the n-th of N draws. The probability of accepting a candidate draw
γ
(n)
c depends on the ratio of the likelihood times the prior when evaluated with the candidate and existing draw,
where we reject the candidate draw if
min
[
1,
p(γc | Ai,Σi)q(yc)
p(γ(t−1) | AiΣi)q(γ(t−1))
]
, (B.15)
and otherweise set γ(n) = γc . We follow Haario et al. (2001) to adapt our tuning parameter C(n) by
C(n) =

C0 if n ≤ Nc,
sdvar(γ1, . . . , γn−1) + sdη if n > Nc,
(B.16)
thereby assuming a constant tuning parameter for the first Nc = 50 draws and afterwards using the empirical
variance to tune the MH-step. We set η to a really small number and use sd to fine tune the algorithm to achieve
acceptance probabilities between 20% and 40%. Note that this algorithm is indeed non-Markovian, but Haario
et al. (2001) show that this tuning algorithm has correct ergodicity properties.
C Diagnostic Expectations
Diagnostic expectations are computed following the derivations from Gennaioli and Shleifer (2018), more precisely
we refer to Proposition 5.1 and 6.1. We assume that the target distribution is the true distribution at time t if no
news is received relative to time t − 1. They show in Proposition 5.1 that if the underlying process, Xˆ is normal with
heteroscedastic errors assuming Xˆ | I0 ∼  (µ0, σ20 ) and Xˆ | I−1 ∼  (µ−1, σ2−1), where I0 denotes the information set
at time t and I−1 the information set one period before, that the mean µθ and variance σ2θ is given by:
µθ = µ0 +
θσ20
σ2−1 + θ(σ2−1 − σ20 )
(µ0 − µ−1),
σ2θ = σ
2
0
σ2−1
σ2−1 + θ(σ2−1 − σ20 )
.
(C.1)
When applied to an AR(1) process with stochastic volatility,
Xˆt+1 | ρ, ht ∼  (ρXˆt,exp(ht+1)),
ht+1 | ht, µ, φ,σ2h ∼  (µ + φ(ht − µ), σ2h ),
h0 | µ, φ,σ2h ∼  (µ,σ2h/(1 − φ2)),
(C.2)
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with σ2t = exp(ht ). The estimation procedure of stochastic volatility models are described in Kastner and Früwirth-
Schnatter (2014). Finally, we can compute the diagnostic expectations with
Eθt (Xˆt+1) = Et (Xˆt+1) + θ[Et (Xˆt+1) − Et−1(Xˆt+1)], (C.3)
where µ0 = Et (Xˆt+1) = ρXˆt with variance σ20 = σ2t . Accordingly the comparison distribution has mean µ−1 =
Et−1(Xˆt+1) = ρ2 Xˆt−1 with variance σ2−1 = σ2t−1.
D Identification based on External Instruments
The identification scheme on external instruments is introduced by Mertens and Ravn (2013). Generally, it is similar
to a two stage least squares procedure, where the reduced form residuals of the structural shock are regressed on the
instrument ZSt . Again, the subscript St denotes only those observations in regime St = i. The fitted values are then
regressed on the other reduced form residuals,

q
St
=
λ
q
i
λ
p
i
ˆ
p
St
+ νSt if St = i. (D.1)
Therefore, we get an estimate for the ratio λ
q
i
λ
p
i
from which we can identify λqi . We by partitioning the matrix of the
structural coefficients, such that
Λi = [λpi Λqi ] = [Λi,1 Λi,2] =
[
λi,11 λi,12
λi,21 λi,22
]
, (D.2)
where λi,11 is a scalar, λTi,12 and λi,21 are vectors of size M − 1 × 1 and λi,22 is a matrix of size M − 1 × M − 1.
Furthermore, we partition the reduced form variance-covariance matrix with Σi,11 being a scalar and the others of the
same size as the elements of Λi ,
Σi =
[
Σi,11 Σi,12
Σi,21 Σi,22
]
. (D.3)
Then λpi is identified up to a sign convention and is obtained by the following closed form solution
(λpi )2 = λ2i,11 = Σi,11 − λi,12λTi,12, (D.4)
where
λi,12λ
T
i,12 = (Σi,21 −
λi,21
λi,11
Σi,11)TQ−1(Σi,21 − λi,21
λi,11
Σi,11), (D.5)
with
Q =
λi,21
λi,11
Σi,11
λT
i,21
λi,11
− (Σi,21
λT
i,21
λi,11
+
λi,21
λi,11
) + Σi,22. (D.6)
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